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California Judicial Council's "Commission for Impartial
Courts"*
Justice Ronald B. Robie,** Justice Richard Fybel,*** and Mary-Beth
Moylan****
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2006, a Judicial Council summit concluded that unless California's
judicial leaders took decisive steps, problems in other states involving judicial
elections and attacks on courts and judges by partisan and special interests could
spread to California.' Responding directly to this prediction, California Chief
Justice Ronald M. George created the Commission for Impartial Courts in
September of 2007.2 In establishing the Commission, he stated:
We are forming the Commission . . . in response to developments in

other states that have changed the tone, tenor, and cost of judicial
elections. The manner in which judges are selected, retained, and
removed from office can have a serious impact on the independence of
the judiciary. It is essential that we make every effort to avoid
politicizing the judiciary so that public confidence in the quality,
impartiality, and accountability of judges is protected and maintained.'
Accordingly, Chief Justice George charged the Commission with the overall
responsibility "to study and recommend ways to ensure judicial quality,
impartiality, and accountability for the benefit of all Californians."

* The views expressed in these remarks are the authors' own and do not reflect the views of the
California Supreme Court, its Advisory Committee on the Code of Judicial Ethics, or the Commission. The
authors wish to thank Dean Parker, Professor Paton, and the staff of the Pacific McGeorge Capital Center for
inviting them to participate in this symposium.
** Justice Robie is an Associate Justice of the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District and
is the first Chair of the California Supreme Court Committee on Judicial Ethics Opinions. He was a member of
the Commission on Impartial Courts.
*** Justice Fybel is an Associate Justice of the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District,
Division Three (Santa Ana) and is the Chair of the California Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on the
Code of Judicial Ethics. He was also a member of the Commission on Impartial Courts.
**** Mary-Beth Moylan is the Director of Global Lawyering Skills at Pacific McGeorge. She also
teaches Election Law and the California Initiative Seminar and was a member of the Commission on Impartial
Courts.
1.
COMM'N FOR IMPARTIAL COURTS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., FINAL REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR SAFEGUARDING JUDICIAL QUALITY, IMPARTIALITY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN CALIFORNIA 1 (2009)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT].

2. Press Release, Judicial Council of Cal., Chief Justice George Names Statewide Commission for
Impartial Courts (Sept. 4, 2007) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).

3. Id.
4.

Id.
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The Commission for Impartial Courts was composed of a single steering
committee, chaired by Justice Ming Chin of the California Supreme Court, and
four task forces organized around the following issues identified by the Judicial
Council summit: (1) judicial campaign conduct, (2) judicial campaign finance,
(3) public information and education, and (4) judicial selection and retention.'
A total of 88 persons participated on the Steering Committee and task
forces, and the authors of this article, Justice Robie, Justice Fybel, and Professor
Moylan, were all participants. Their presentation at the Judicial Ethics and
Accountability At Home and Abroad Symposium focused on their experience
working with the Commission. This article memorializes that presentation and
offers a short report of the work done by the Commission, in addition to
discussing the ongoing implementation of its recommendations.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS
In December of 2009, the Commission issued its Final Report with seventyone recommendations for maintaining respectable standards of "judicial
impartiality, quality, and accountability" in California. These recommendations
reflect the work and studies done by the four task forces, which were then
adopted and proposed by the Steering Committee.'
The Commission's recommendations relating to the Task Force on Public
Information and Education were based on various findings made by the judges,
lawyers, and experts working in that group. For example, the Commission found
that there is not only a serious lack of civics education in California secondary
schools, particularly with regard to the Courts,9 but also that "[t]here is an urgent,
immediate and long-term need to inform and educate the public ... about the
importance of fair, impartial and accountable courts."'o It also found that "[n]o
consistent response mechanism is in place to deal with unwarranted attacks on
the judicial process.""
The Commission's recommended solutions to these problems included the
following: (1) public outreach and response to criticism;12 (2) education;13 (3) voter
5. Id.
6. For a description of the overall structure of the commission, including its steering committee and task
forces, see id. at 3-5. For a complete list of membership, see id. at apps. A-E, 109-118; see also id. at 5-6
(noting that each task force had a consultant with expertise in the area of its charge).
7. Id. at 7, 12.
8. Id. at 12.
9. See id. at 10 ("In California, the public, legislators, students, and voters are not sufficiently educated
about the role of the courts and the importance of judicial impartiality. . . . Civics instruction in the schools has
been dramatically limited during the past decades, and while positive efforts have been made in courtcommunity outreach and educational programs, more is needed.").
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 60. The commission suggested several actions for the judicial branch to take to achieve this
solution. Among other proposed objectives, they encouraged the judicial branch to: (1) "identify and
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education;14 (4) education of potential applicants for judgeships; and (5)
accountability and judicial self-improvement."
The Commission's recommendations emerging from the Task Force on
Selection and Retention focused on retaining the present California modified
merit system for appointment of judges, a process currently handled by the State
Bar's Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation ("JNE"). 7 An inspection of
the JNE process was one of the task force's key actions, and the Final Report
contains a lengthy discussion concerning merit selection and the JNE process.
Aided by the task force's work, the Commission made several
recommendations to further improve the JNE process including: (1) giving
greater publicity to JNE members' background and diversity;' 9 (2) "requir[ing]
that a JNE rating of 'not qualified' . . . for a trial court judge be made public
automatically at the time of appointment"; 20 (3) mandating by legislation "the
current practice of releasing the JNE rating for a prospective appellate justice";"
(4) excluding a statement of reasons from the JNE rating; 22 (5) explaining the
JNE and judicial appointment processes on three linked websites; 23 (6)
disseminate essential information [to] increase . . . the public's access to justice"; (2) "solicit[] . . . public
feedback on issues such as judicial performance and satisfaction"; (3) "train[] ... judges on how to present ...
court decisions in a way that can be easily understood by . . . the public"; (4) educate elected officials "on the
importance of the judicial branch"; (5) train court personnel and the media to report on legal issues; (6) and
develop "a model for responding to unwarranted criticism of the judicial branch" while "ensur[ing] that valid
criticism are referred to the appropriate bodies for response." Id. at 60-66.
13. Id. at 66. To accomplish this goal, the commission recommended ensuring that "every child in the
state . . . receive a quality civics education" including instruction on "the judiciary and its function in a
democratic society." Id. at 67.
14. Id. at 71. This proposed solution involved "ensur[ing] that voters can make informed choices about
candidates for judicial office . . . ." Id. at 72.
15. Id. at 73 (the commission recommended that the State Bar be "asked to offer [such] an educational
course.").

16. Id. at 74. To attain this goal, the judicial branch was asked to: (1) develop "[a] model selfimprovement program ... for voluntary use by courts and individual judges"; (2) inform the public of existing
systems "to deal with judicial performance issues in fair and effective ways . . ."; and (3) encourage courts "to
use CourTools or similar court performance measures." Id. at 75-76.
17. See id. at 77 ("The State Bar's Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation process, a unique form
of a merit-based screening and selection system that has served California well, should be retained."). The task
force's following findings supported this recommendation: "Under the present system of judicial selection in
California, the State Bar's Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation (JNE) evaluates and reports to the
Governor on every person before appointment as a ... judge or justice. The California system functions largely
in the same manner as the merit selection systems in some other states. . . . California's JNE system works well
and is partially responsible for the high quality of judicial appointments in California." Id. at 10-11.
18. Id. at 77-81.
19. Id. at 81.
20. Id. The task force also recommended that the current similar practice for appellate justices be made
mandatory. Id. at 82.
21. Id.
22. Id. The concern behind this recommendation was that a "release of reasons would compromise [the]
confidentiality [of the JNE fact gathering process] and ultimately the value and validity of the rating system."
Id.
23. Id. at 83. The three websites are the California Court's website for the judicial branch, the State
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encouraging law schools "to provide information about the judicial appointment
process to law students";A (7) encouraging JNE "members [to] speak to local and
specialty bar associations, service organizations, and other civic groups";" and
(8) requiring that any member of the State Bar Board of Governors who attends a
"JNE meeting comply with the JNE conflict of interest rules."26 The task force
was also concerned about the low level of public knowledge on candidates for
judicial office and their qualifications." It thus recommended a study to develop
methods of increasing this knowledge including developing a model of judicial
candidate evaluation.
Equally important to the effective selection and retention of judges is
enhancing diversity on the bench. In this area, the Commission recommended
actions such as: (1) directing courts "to consider, when making appointments of
subordinate judicial officers,2 9 both the diverse aspects of the applicants and the
applicants' exposure to and experience with diverse populations and their related
issues";o (2) arranging for JNE to "gather information regarding judicial
applicants' exposure to and experience with diverse populations and issues
related to those populations and ... communicate this information to the
Governor";" (3) encouraging the Governor to "consider an applicant's exposure
to and experience with diverse populations .

.

. and request this information on

32

the judicial application form"; (4) insisting that the "judicial branch's public
outreach programs ... encourage qualified members of the bar to consider
applying for judicial office."33
On the suggestion of the task force, the Commission rejected significant
modification of the current election system, preferring the status quo over any
increase in the length of judicial terms of office including lifetime
appointments.3 It also declined to adopt any measures to substitute retention
elections at the trial court level35 or eliminate open elections. The Commission

Bar's JNE website, and the Governor's judicial application website. Id.; see The Judicial Branch of California,
California Courts, http://www.couninfo.ca.gov/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); The State Bar of California, Judicial Nominees Evaluation, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/AboutUs/
JudicialNomineesEvaluation.aspx (last visited Aug. 30, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Office
of the Governor, Judicial Appointments, http://gov.ca.gov/appointments/judicial (last visited Aug., 30, 2010)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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24.

FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 83.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 84-86.
Many subordinate judicial officers go on to be selected as judges.

30.

FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 87.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 90 (trial judges); id. at 94-95 (appellate judges).
Id. at 90-91.
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did, however, recommend a series of statutory and constitutional changes to
improve the existing election system."
These suggested modifications included: (1) changing the provision for recall
of a judge by petition so that the required amount of signatures would be equal to
the twenty percent of those who turned out to vote for the county district attorney
at the most recent election, rather than the twenty percent of those who turned out
to vote for a judge;" (2) amending the California constitution to provide that a
judge serve "at least two years before his or her first election"; 9 (3) changing the
number of signatures needed to place an unopposed judicial election on the ballot
for a potential write-in election from 100 signatures to the lesser of 100
signatures or one percent of the vote for district attorney in the last election;4 (4)
permitting a challenge to an unopposed judge only at the primary election; 41 (5)
reordering and making minor clarifying changes to California's constitutional
provisions concerning judicial elections; 42 (6) modifying the time frame for
appellate retention elections to provide that they are to be held every two years
instead of every four years; 43 and (7) adjusting the initial election term for an
appellate justice to a full twelve year term rather than a term equal to the
remainder of the previous justice's term.4
In addition to these suggested changes, the task force also recommended
41
further study of methods for ensuring prompt satisfaction of judicial vacancies.
This recommendation resulted from a finding that lengthy judicial vacancies
often "contribute to a backlog in the courts, delay justice, and potentially reduce
the quality of justice."46
The remaining two task forces-Judicial Campaign Conduct and Judicial
Campaign Finance-suggested recommendations which will be discussed in
more detail below.
From a procedural standpoint, the Commission's Final Report was accepted
by the Judicial Council in December 2009. In January 2010, the Judicial Council
began considering and acting upon each of the seventy-one detailed
recommendations at its regular meetings. It will continue to do so regularly
36. Id. at 91-92.
37. Id. at 92-94.
38. Id. at 92. The concern addressed by this recommendation was the low number of votes for a typical
judicial election. The district attorney election, on the other hand, is the only countywide election in every
county. Id.
39. Id. (trial court judges); id. at 96 (appellate justices).
40. Id. at 93.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 93-94; see also CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (a)-(d) (where subdivisions (a) and (d) refer to
appellate offices and subdivisions (b) and (c) address superior court offices in a somewhat confusing
arrangement).
43. Id. at 95.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 96.
46. Id.
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throughout 2011.
III. BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT LAWS RELATING TO JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS IN CALIFORNIA

Over the past decade, the United States Supreme Court decided several close
and controversial cases involving the campaign conduct of judicial candidates
and the financial contributions they receive .47The amount of money that is
annually contributed to judicial campaigns by corporations, unions, lawyers, and
others is astounding. According to the nonprofit national partnership Justice at
Stake Campaign, amounts raised in the decade from 1989 to 1998 in judicial
campaigns were about $85 million. 48 In contrast, from 1999-2008 that amount
rose to $200 million.49
To best understand the Commission's recommended changes to the law, it is
helpful for one to review existing California law on these subjects. California
laws on disclosure and disqualification of judges are contained in the canons of
the California Code of Judicial Ethics (judicial ethics canons) and the California
Code of Civil Procedure (CCP).50 The judicial ethics canons are promulgated by
the California Supreme Court pursuant to article six, section eighteen of the
California Constitution, which states that "[t]he Supreme Court shall make rules
for the conduct of judges, both on and off the bench, and for judicial candidates
in conduct of their campaigns."' Judges may be disciplined for violations of the
judicial ethics canons by the Commission on Judicial Performance, subject to
discretionary review by the California Supreme Court.52 The judicial ethics
canons cover disclosures by trial judges and disqualification of both trial judges
and appellate justices. 3 The preamble to the judicial ethics canons recognizes the
principle that the California legal system requires independent and fair judges
who "respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust" under the rule of
law. The judicial ethics canons also contain commentary by the Supreme

47. See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (holding that a law prohibiting
judicial candidates from "announcing" their opinions was unconstitutionally restrictive of free speech rights);
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009) (holding that a due process violation could be
asserted where a State Supreme Court Justice refused to recuse himself from a case in which a major campaign
donor was a party); Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010) (holding that
corporations could not be precluded from exercising free speech rights in political campaigns).
48. Bert Brandenburg, Is Justice For Sale?, 16 EXPERIENCE 11 (2009), available at http://www.
justiceatstake.org/medialcms/Brandenberg-B77CDA83E0029.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
49. Id.
50. CAL. CODE OF JuD. ETHICS Canon 3(E) (2009); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 170.1 (2005)-170.6
(2004).
51. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(m).
52. Dodds v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 12 Cal. 4th 163, n. 2 (1995).
53. See CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETHICS Canon 3(E) (2009) (referencing the disqualification provisions in the
CCP and applies other standards of disqualification for appellate justices).
54. CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETHICS pmbl. (2009).
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Court's Advisory Committee (Advisory Committee). "
The existing law on disclosure by trial judges is set forth in canon 3E(2) of
the judicial ethics canons. This canon provides that "in all trial court proceedings,
a judge shall disclose on the record information that is reasonably relevant to the
question of disqualification under [the mandatory disqualification standards of
CCP section 170.1 ." Notably, there are no existing disclosure requirements for
appellate justices contained in the judicial ethics canons or the CCP.
The CCP encompasses the current laws pertaining to the disqualification of
trial judges. Under CCP section 170.1, subdivision (a), a judge should be
disqualified if that judge: (1) "has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary
facts concerning the proceeding"; (2) "served as a lawyer in the proceeding . .. or
gave advice to any party . . . upon any matter involved in the action or

proceeding"; (3) "has a financial interest in the subject matter in a proceeding or
in a party to the proceeding";58 (4) "is related to a party"; (6) believes he or she
may be impartial, perceived as impartial, or simply that recusing him or herself
would further interest of justice; (7) is physically or mentally impaired; or (8) has
negotiated prospective employment in Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) and
the issues in the case are related to ADR.5 9
In addition to these mandatory recusal standards, CCP section 170.6,
subdivision (a)(2) gives a party one timely peremptory challenge to a trial judge
presiding over his or her case.6 0 Disqualification of a judge after the one
peremptory challenge must be on a basis outlined by the CCP, as each party is
61
only permitted one peremptory challenge per case.
CCP section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii) already requires that a judge is
disqualified if a person aware of facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the
judge would be able to be impartial. On this subject, the disqualification of
appellate justices is governed by canon 3E(4) which tracks CCP section 170.1,
subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii).
IV. SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION RELATING
TO JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS

While the Commission's recommendations are numerous, this paper focuses
on several that were already endorsed by the Judicial Council- specifically
numbers 29, 30, and 33-and several that will be reviewed by the Judicial

55.
56.
57.
58.
of $1,500
59.
60.
61.

Id.
CAL. CODE OFJUD. ETHICS Canon 3(E)(2) (2009).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 170.1 (2005)-170.6 (2004).
"Financial interest" is generally defined in the CCP and the judicial ethics canons as an investment
or more in a stock or bond, excluding mutual funds. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 170.1(a)(3) (2005);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 170.1(a)(1)-(8) (2005); CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETHICS Canon 3(E)(2).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.6(a)(2) (2010).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.6(a)(3) (2004);
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Council in the upcoming months. Recommendations 29, 30, and 33 were already
forwarded to the Supreme Court for consideration. If the others are also
endorsed, they too will be forwarded to the Supreme Court. Of course, the
California Legislature may also enact statutes covering any or all of these topics.
In accordance with its usual practice, the Supreme Court asked its Advisory
Committee to review and comment on these proposals. It also requested that the
Advisory Committee comment on the ABA's new Model Code of Judicial
Conduct; California judges are not covered by the ABA Model Code. As
discussed below, some of the Commission's recommendations are similar to new
provisions in the ABA Model Code.
A. Recommendation No. 29.
This recommendation requires disclosure by trial judges of campaign
contributions to a judge's campaign committee that exceed one hundred dollars,63
an amount based on reporting requirements for the California Fair Political
Practices Commission (FPPC). 4 There are strong arguments in favor of
disclosure of these contributions, and not many arguments against it. The key
issues regarding disclosure arise with respect to how these amounts will be
disclosed and how the people that made them will be defined. As to the manner
of disclosure, any potential rule must be clear that disclosure is not made in a
way that suggests that a party or lawyer who has not already contributed should
do so. The next question is how rules should apply to independent expenditures
that are made to a separate organization and not to a campaign committee. How
should contributions from persons in the same company or law firm be treatedshould their contributions be aggregated? How should a rule treat contributions
to an organization that opposes another candidate?
It is evident that questions of from whom and to whom will arise in response
to this recommendation. So the question becomes: how exactly should the Code
deal with this issue? Should the Code be limited to addressing disclosure of
contributions to a campaign committee as proposed or should it also cover
contributions to other entities? In all likelihood the FPPC is in the best position to
craft rules for disclosure and answer this series of questions posed.
B. Recommendation No. 30
This recommendation requires disqualification of a trial judge if the judge's
campaign committee receives 1,500 dollars or more as a campaign contribution
from a party or lawyer in a case.6 This amount is tied to the disqualifying amount
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62.

See generally MODEL CODE JUD. CONDUCr (2007).

63.
64.
65.

FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 87.
Id, at 33.
Id. at 34-35.
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of an investment in stocks or bonds under CCP section 170.5. The
recommendation of this particular amount raises some questions of its own. Is
this amount reasonable? Should the amount differ depending on the locale? The
ABA Model Code adopted a similar provision but, as Professor Geyh remarked
during the Symposium, the ABA "punted" the amount issue by leaving blanks to
fill in the numbers later. Why aren't the protections of CCP section 170.6,
subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii) and canon 3E of the Code sufficient? Again, there is the
persistent problem of identifying from whom and to whom the contribution is
made.
C. RecommendationNo. 33.
This recommendation addresses the disqualification of appellate justices.6
The threshold amount leading to disqualification differs for justices of the Court
of Appeal and the Supreme Court. 67 The proposal also recommends the same
dollar limit for Court of Appeal justices as for trial judges even though some
Court of Appeal districts span several large counties.68 With this
recommendation, many may be left wondering if this is a realistic goal. Notably,
the contributions to a campaign committee for a Supreme Court justice would
track the limits for a candidate for Governor. And, of course, this
recommendation also raises the same questions concerning from whom and to
whom the contributions are made.
D. RecommendationNo. 5.
This recommendation pertains to disqualification for certain public
statements made by judicial candidates.69 Canon 5B of the Code provides that
"[a] candidate for election or appointment to judicial office shall not (1) make
statements to the electorate or the appointing authority that commit the candidate
with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that could come before the courts,
or (2) knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, misrepresent the
identity, qualifications, present position, or any other fact concerning the
candidate or his or her opponent."o This recommendation would mandate
disqualification of a judge on a case if the judge or candidate made such a
commitment.

66. Id. at 35.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 15.
70.

CAL. CODE OF JUD. ETHICS Canon 5(B) (2009).
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E. Recommendation No. 22.
This recommendation prohibits a candidate from seeking or using
endorsements from political parties." Article VI, section 6, subdivision (a) of the
California Constitution provides that all judicial offices are nonpartisan. In the
California Supreme Court case of Unger v. Superior Court, the Court held that
the California Constitution does not prohibit political parties from endorsing
judges in nonpartisan elections.7 2 Notably, the case was decided on grounds of
the California Constitution regarding its nonpartisan provisions, not on First
Amendment grounds. "
The ABA Model Code earlier adopted the same provision on this subject as
now recommended by the Commission. Now the question is whether California
should follow suit. The recommendation raises serious First Amendment
concerns, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has already held the provision
unconstitutional. 74 The proposal by the Commission also does not address special
interest groups who could still endorse a candidate. To take one relevant
example, the Symposium featured the Honorable Mr. Justice John Hedigan of the
High Court in Dublin, Ireland. He told the story of a recent visit to Chicago,
where he saw a campaign placard that read, "Vote Flanagan for Judge" with the
word "Democrat" below the candidate's name. The sign did not state "endorsed
by the Democratic Party." Under the current wording of Recommendation No.
22, it is unclear whether this sign would be banned; and if so, whether such a ban
would violate individual rights under the First Amendment.
Why prohibit the use of endorsements by political parties if a candidate (who
receives or does not receive a party endorsement) can simply list his or her party
affiliation? Could the Code constitutionally prohibit a candidate from simply
saying, "I'm a Republican and my opponent is not"? These rhetorical questions
may answer themselves and, in so doing, raise serious concerns about
Recommendation No. 22. As suggested by Professor Paul D. Paton this
recommendation "will spark fierce debate."75
A recent San Francisco case highlights the debate. The race is between a
sitting San Francisco County Superior Court judge and a challenger with a focus
on partisan differentiation. The November election will determine the winner
after a primary race resulted in neither candidate winning 50 percent of the
vote." The presiding Justice of the First District Court of Appeal, Justice
71. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 27-28.
72. 37 Cal. 3d 612 (1984).
73. Id.
74. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005) cert. denied sub nom. Dinick
v. Republican Party of Minnesota 546 U.S. 1157 (2006).
75. Paul D. Paton, Op-Ed., Why Judges are Now Defendants in the Court of Public Opinion,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 4, 2010, at E5.
76. J. Anthony Kline, Judicial Election PresentsPoliticalDangers, S.F. DAILY JOURNAL, July 12, 2010
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review.)
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Anthony Kline, predicts that the unseating of the San Francisco County Superior
Court judge on the basis that he was a registered "Republican" and appointed by
Governor Schwarzenegger will undermine the independence of the judiciary."
Justice Kline's main point is that challenges to sitting judges should be brought
against those judges who are not properly performing their function, and not for
political efficiency reasons. 78
F. RecommendationNo. 10
This recommendation proposes to amend the Code of Judicial Ethics "to
require all judicial candidates, including incumbent judges, to complete a
mandatory training program on ethical campaign conduct." 9
Other states (e.g., NY and Ohio) have mandatory training and article VI,
section 18(m) of the California Constitution seems to permit it.8 In an effort to
limit the burden of the requirement, the necessary training would apply only to
candidates who appear on the ballot-not to those unopposed superior court
judges-and would be available in an on-line form for judges in rural counties."
The members of the task force that proposed this training assumed that the
Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), the Center for Judicial Education and
Research (CJER), and the State Bar would develop a training program to satisfy
the requirement.82 With resources of the AOC, CJER, and State Bar significantly
strained in these economic times, funding for creation of a new mandatory
judicial campaign ethics training program is likely dubious.
G. Recommendation No. 11
Assuming adoption of Recommendation No. 10, the Commission also
included a recommendation to address the content that such a judicial candidate
training would include." The Commission's recommendation included the
following list of training areas: (1)"[i]dentifying issues raised by judicial
candidate questionnaires"; (2) "[d]istributing a model letter and a model
questionnaire that candidates can use in lieu of responding to an interest group
questionnaire"; (3) "[u]sing the advisory memorandum on responding to
questionnaires prepared by the National Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on Judicial
Campaign Oversight" (this advisory memorandum was attached as Appendix H
to the Commission report); (4) "[e]ncouraging candidates to give reasoned

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 20.
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(m).
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 20.
Id.
Id. at 21.
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explanations for not responding to improper questionnaires rather than simply
citing advisory opinions"; (5) "[u]sing candidate [w]eb sites"; and (6)
"[e]xplaining why partisan activity by candidates is disfavored".84
At the task force level, much of the discussion about this list of training areas
centered on the issue of judicial questionnaires." The task force agreed that a
model letter and perhaps a model questionnaire could be distributed-either from
an organization or through the mandatory training program-for use by
candidates at their discretion.86 The model letter would serve the purpose of
explaining why a judicial candidate should not express his or her personal views
on controversial or high-profile issues that might come before him or her. The
idea of a model questionnaire is to show the kinds of questions that should be
appropriate and relevant to a judicial campaign.
H. Recommendation Nos. 7-9.
This series of recommendations calls for the establishment of an unofficial
statewide fair judicial elections committee "to educate candidates, the public, and
the media about judicial elections; to mediate conflicts; and to issue public
statements regarding campaign conduct in statewide and regional elections and in
local elections where there is no local committee."" The idea of the unofficial
statewide committee would be to educate candidates, the public, and the media
about fair judicial elections. These committees could also "combat speech with
more speech" in the event that there was an example of improper campaign
conduct.
The recommendations further encourage "formation of unofficial local fair
judicial elections committees to educate candidates, the public, and the media
about judicial elections; to mediate conflicts; and to issue public statements
regarding campaign conduct in local elections." 90 Additionally, the Commission
suggested that "a model campaign conduct code for use by the state and local
oversight committees should be developed."9 '
These three related recommendations were made in an effort to aggressively
address the issue of third parties and special interest groups in judicial
campaigns. 92 There was considerable discussion by the task force about whether
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an official statewide committee or a series of unofficial, locally-established fair
judicial elections committees should be encouraged.9
An obvious benefit of having an official statewide committee would be the
ability to have a uniform statewide standard of conduct. 94
other words, the
on
California legislature "could establish a judicial oversight committee"-or even
expand an arm of an existing oversight commission.95 This may, however, lead to
a conflict with article VI, section 18(m) of the California Constitution which
gives the authority to regulate the conduct of judges to the Supreme Court, not
the legislature.
Although it was ultimately recommended that an unofficial statewide
committee be created, it was also suggested that this committee not supplant
already-existing local committees in various counties (like Santa Clara and Los
Angeles) across California. Additionally, it noted that the statewide committee
could provide valuable resources for the state, such as model standards and codes
of campaign conduct.9
I.

Recommendation No. 24.
Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Ethics or its commentary should be
amended to place an affirmative duty on judicial candidates to control the
actions of their campaigns and the content of campaign statements, to
encourage candidates to take reasonable measures to protect against oral or
informal written misrepresentations being made on their behalf by third
parties, and to take appropriate corrective action if they learn of such
misrepresentations."

A compromise regarding this recommendation resulted in the language to
"encourage" rather than mandate with respect to oral or informal written
misrepresentations made on a candidate's behalf by third parties. ' Giving the
candidate his or herself the affirmative duty to control those materials coming
directly from the campaign committee is appropriate and consistent with the
practice in other political campaigns. Placing a burden, even a small one, on a
candidate to take corrective action against someone making a non-coordinated
statement might seem onerous.
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V. NEXT STEPS FOR COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS
The Judicial Council reviewed and approved several of the recommendations
discussed above at its February 26, 2010 meeting.'o' On April 23, 2010, a number
of other recommendations, including Recommendation No. 24, were presented to
the Judicial Council. 02 On June 25, 2010, twelve recommendations were
presented to the Judicial Council, including Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, and 22 discussed
above.0 o At the last two meetings, recommendations 24 and 7-9 were approved
and forwarded to the Supreme Court for implementation.'04 Recommendations 10
and 22 were not approved by the Judicial Council.'05 As noted above, these two
recommendations, No. 10 relating to mandatory training and No. 22 prohibiting
the use of political party endorsements, were controversial amongst the
Commission members.'" Having failed to gain Judicial Council approval, the
recommendations will be presented to the Supreme Court nonetheless, but the
likelihood of adoption is much less.
The implementation committee of the Commission has planned continued
presentation of recommendations at meetings held regularly until December
2010.
Whatever the ultimate resolution of these recommendations by the
Commission, judges will soon have a Supreme Court Committee on Judicial
Ethics Opinions to ask for advice on their interpretation. One of this article's
authors, Justice Ronald B. Robie, has been appointed by the Supreme Court as
the Committee's first Chair.'o7

101. The Commission approved recommendations 29, 30, and 33. See supra Part IV.
102. California Judicial Council Agenda, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/jc/documents/agn20100423.pdf
(last visited June 2, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
103. California Judicial Council Meeting Minutes, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/jc/meetings.htm (last
visited Sept. 14, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See supra Part IV.E-F.
107. Justice Fybel and Professor Moylan extend congratulations to Justice Robie on this important role.
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